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The surprise exam paradox and its variants have achieved zombie-
like status in the philosophical literature: despite many attempts
to kill them they live on. Some of the most prominent readings
of the surprise exam announcement are surveyed. The versions
pushed by the logicians are chosen to highlight features of the
concept of provability. In this they succeed but at the price of
providing contorted self-referential readings of the announcement.
The versions pushed by the epistemologists are chosen to provide
a stress test for the concepts of knowledge and justified belief.
In this they succeed but at the price of entangling the resolution
of the paradox with controversies surrounding these concepts. A
reading that is free of such controversies and that allows a res-
olution of the paradox to stand out is offered. This resolution
does not provide any deep lessons that could not be learned from
other sources. Nevertheless the paradox and its variants deserve
to live on as a superb teaching instrument.
1 Introduction
A teacher announces to the students in her Philosophy 101 course that the
following week they will be given an exam during class on one of the meeting
days, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday. And because the
teacher wants to keep the students on their toes she also announces that
it will be a surprise exam– the students will not know in advance when
the exam will take place. Waiting until after class so as not to embarrass
1The aficionados of the surprise exam paradox will find little new in this paper. But
I hope that my framing of the issues and critical commentary will serve as a useful guide
to those who are about to plunge into a large and tangled literature in search of an
understanding of why this paradox has resisted a commonly accepted resolution.
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her teacher, Laura, a budding logician, politely informs her instructor that,
however she tries to arrange it, her plans for a surprise exam cannot succeed.
The exam cannot be set on Friday, for it were the students would know on
Thursday evening that Friday is the exam day and so will not be surprised.
Having ruled out Friday, Thursday can also be ruled out since on Wednesday
evening the students will know that Thursday is the exam day. Etc.2
There are many names and many variants of the surprise exam paradox
(the unexpected hanging, the unexpected tiger, the prediction paradox, ....).
One of the most charming and useful ones is the spatialized version intro-
duced by Roy Sorensen (1982, 1984). The teacher asks for five volunteers
and, mirable dictu, the volunteers are named Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday, and Friday. The teacher lines them up, all facing in one direction
with Monday at the front, and Friday at the rear. The line is staggered
so that each of the students has a view of the backs of all the students in
front of her. The teacher announces that she will put a Post-it on the back
of each of the students. One, and only one, of the Post-its has a gold star
on it. And, the teacher asserts, the student graced by the gold star will be
surprised– she will not know she has received the star until she retrieves the
Post-it from her back or the line breaks up and she can see the backs of
the other students. Before the teacher can proceed with the demonstration
the exceptionally precocious student volunteers inform her that she cannot
possibly succeed in doing what her announcement claims. Student Friday,
at the back of the line, reasons that the star cannot be placed on his back
because if it were he would be able to see that none of the other four have it
on their backs and from this infer that it must be on his. Student Thursday
can go through the same reasoning, and having ruled out student Friday as
wearing the gold star, student Thursday can conclude by similar reasoning
that the star cannot be placed on her back. Etc. This spatialized version is
useful not only for purposes of demonstration, but it is important in showing
that the temporal dimension is not essential to the paradox– the paradox can
2The most often repeated origin story attributes the discovery of the paradox to Lennart
Ekbom, a Swedish mathematician. The story goes that in 1943 (or 1944?) the Swedish
Broadcasting Company announced that there would be a civil defense drill the following
week. And to make the drill realistic the day of the drill would not be announced so that
the citizens would not know in advance when the drill was to take place. Ekbom detected
paradox in the announcement. W. V. O. Quine reports that the paradox was circulating
by the end of 1943 among cryptoanalyists in Washington D.C. and that it may have come
from Tarski (see Sorensen 1988, pp. 262-263).
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arise with information accumulating along a spatial axis rather than along a
temporal axis.
Many philosophers have weighed in on the surprise exam paradox and
its variants– heavy weights, overweights, and lightweights– with articles ap-
pearing in leading philosophy journals as well as the Notices of the Ameri-
can Mathematical Society and the American Mathematical Monthly.3 It has
found its way into popular culture, as attested by multiple videos on YouTube
dramatizing the unexpected hanging version.4 It is a paradox that refuses
to die– someone is always waiting in the wings to claim that the paradox
has not been satisfactorily resolved and, perhaps, to claim to offer a new
resolution.
There are three mutually reinforcing reasons for the longevity of the sur-
prise exam paradox. One is that the paradox resonates with a number of
other paradoxes including the liar, sorities, Moore’s paradox, the lottery
paradox. Second, the surprise exam is a kind of Rorschach test for philos-
ophy. Logicians see it is an opportunity to display their wares– including
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (e.g. Ardeshir and Ramezanian 2012, Chow
1998, Fitch 1964, Halpern and Moses 1968, and Kritchman and Raz 2010).5
Epistemologists see it as an opportunity to explore the concepts of knowledge
and justified belief (e.g. Sorensen 1982, 1984, 1988, and 2017). Still others
see it as a hybrid of logical and epistemological issues (e.g. Kaplan and Mon-
tague 1960). Third, the variety of reactions to this Rorschach test is fueled
by the fact that the surprise exam announcement is a misnomer: there are
multiple ways of reading the announcement, and the resulting paradoxes, if
any, call for resolutions that may differ from reading to reading.
In what follows I will examine some of the most prominent readings of
the surprise exam announcement. Broadly speaking, these readings can be
divided into two categories: self-referential vs. non-self-referential. Many of
3The philosophical discussion apparently commences with O’Conner (1948) followed by
a flurry of 1950s articles in Mind starting with Scriven (1951). Martin Gardner can take
credit for popularizing the paradox; see, for example, Gardner (1963). For a good overview
of the tangled history of the philosophical discussion of the surprise exam paradox the
reader is referred to Chapter 8 (“History of the Prediction Paradox”) of Sorensen (1988).
Chow’s (2011) arXix version of his (1998) contains a complete bibliography through
2011; it has nearly 200 entries. And since then the flow of articles continues unabated.
4At last count there were 20 or more YouTube videos on the Unexpected Hanging.
5The surprise exam paradox has also been analyzed using modal logic (Binkley 1968),
dynamic epistemic logic (Gerbrandy 2007), and constructive mathematics (Adeshir and
Ramezian 2012).
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the self-referential readings produce paradox in the form of antinomies. This
makes the paradox resolution simple– the teacher uttered a self-contradictory
statement; but at the same time it raises the issue of whether the read-
ing captures the teacher’s intention. Other self-referential readings avoid
antinomy but only through acts of contortion that produce a surprise exam
announcement that most teachers and students wouldn’t recognize. The
non-self-referential readings are typically framed in terms of knowledge or
justified belief. While providing stress-tests for these concepts, the resulting
paradoxes and puzzles offer little in the way new insights that are the hall-
mark of a worthy paradox. Finally, I will propose a deflationary reading of
the surprise announcement that the students would take to be natural. It
avoids wrangles about how the analyze and how to reason with the concepts
of knowledge and justified belief. And it allows the surprise exam paradox
to be put quietly to bed.
The striking conclusion that emerges from this critical survey of the liter-
ature is that, contrary to popular impression, the problem with the surprise
exam paradox is not in finding a resolution but in generating a paradox.
Paradox hunters who are determined to find paradox will find one, but only
by using implausible readings of the surprise exam announcement or employ-
ing suspect assumptions and/or questionable inference principles.
2 The logical turn
Many versions of the paradox take ‘surprise’to mean that students will not
know on the evening before the exam that the exam will take place the next
day. Knowledge is a fraught notion. But whatever its analysis, if the students
don’t know that X then they cannot prove that X. So the idea behind the
logical turn is to avoid controversy about the analysis of knowledge by taking
‘surprise’to mean that on the evening before the day of the exam the students
will not be able to prove that the exam will fall on the following day. And to
lend precision to the enterprise, provability is taken to mean provability in a
formal system of inference L. The properties of L will prove to be relevant
to the statement and resolution of some forms of the paradox
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2.1 First version of the surprise exam announcement
I will adopt the formal nomenclature of Kritchman and Raz (2010) with some
modifications in notation. For the N -day version of the announcement the
day of the exam is denoted by m where 1 ≤ m ≤ N , and the evenings before
possible exam days are indexed by j, where 0 ≤ j ≤ N −1. Pr[Ij](X) means
that in the formal system L there is a proof of X from Ij, the information
available to the students on the evening of day j.6 Using this notation a tem-
plate for the N -day provability version of the surprise exam announcement
is given by
A : (m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N})&∀0≤j≤N−1[(m = j + 1)→ ¬Pr[Ij](m = j + 1)]
I will work mainly with the case we started with, N = 5, but other cases as
well will be discussed.
To make this template into a definite announcement we need to know
what information Ij is available on the evening of day j and available in what
sense. Presumably it is information known by the students to be true on the
evening of day j. This is certainly not information known in the provability
sense but information known in the sense of ordinary and scientific discourse.
So already the logical turn leads to a mismatch in senses of knowledge. Ignore
this for the nonce. Ij may include, for example, the information furnished by
memory that the exam has not taken place as of the evening of day j. And
it may also include the information that, surprising or not, there will be an
exam the following week. Taking these possibilities on board, the informal
form of announcement becomes:
Attention students! Next week there will be an exam on exactly
one of the days Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Fri-
day. And on the evening before the exam you will not be able
prove, on the basis of the fact that the exam will be on exactly
one of the days Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Fri-
day and on the basis of the information that the exam has not
taken place as of that evening, that the exam will be on the next
day.
6Strictly speaking there should be quotation marks around X to indicate that it a
sentence of the language of the system L. But since the notation is complicated enough
already I will omit the quotation marks.
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Using the suggested notation the formalization of the five-day version of the
announcement is:
A51 : (m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})&∀0≤j≤4[(m = j+1)→ ¬Pr[m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},m /∈ {0, .., j}](m = j+1)]
Pr can be taken to be the proof predicate for calculus (PC), which is
provably consistent and complete. (A1 is a sentence of some suitable meta-
language for PC, say, ZFC where the proof predicate Pr[...](...) for PC is
defined. But the point is that the sentences being plugged into the square
and round brackets in Pr[...](...) can be replaced by well-formed formulas
of PC, although I will not bother to do so here.) With this understand-
ing, no paradox results from A1. Take the case of j = 4. A51 implies
(m = 5) → ¬Pr[m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},m /∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}(m = 5)]. Obviously
Pr[m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},m /∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}](m = 5) holds. So by modus tollens
m 6= 5, establishing the base case for the backward induction.7 But the
backwards induction stops there. Take the next case of j = 3. A51 implies
(m = 4)→ ¬Pr[m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},m /∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}](m = 4)]. But now modus
tollens cannot be applied since ¬Pr[m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},m /∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}](m =
4)](m = 4), unless PC + (m ∈ {4, 5}) is inconsistent– which obviously it is
not.
Evidently then A51 is consistent, and A
5
1 is true if the exam is given on
any day but Friday. Paradox resolved. Hurrah! But not for long– this was
too easy.
2.2 A self-referential version of the surprise announce-
ment
The logicians are determined to find paradox so that they can apply their
tool kit. (If you have a hammer ...) Towards this end they investigate a
self-referential version of the surprise exam announcement.8 Informally it
says:
7Backwards inductive reasoning per se is not suspect. It is widely used in game theory;
see Auman (1995). Kritchman and Raz (2010) use Chaitin’s incompleteness theorem and
backwards induction to give a new proof of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. It
is true, however, that backwards induction is used in a number of paradoxes (see Bovens
1997 and Sobel 1993), and this is what may have given it a bad odor.
8Shaw (1958) was apparently the first to discuss self-referential versions.
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Attention students! There will be an exam next week on exactly
one of the days Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Fri-
day. And on the evening before the exam you will not be able
prove, on the basis of this announcement and the information
that the exam has not taken place as of that evening, that the
exam will be on the next day.
Using the notation introduced above the formalization becomes:
A52 : (m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})&∀0≤j≤4[(m = j+1)→ ¬Pr[A52,m /∈ {0, ..., j}](m = j+1)]
Self-reference raises some red flags. The most immediate worry is that
because of self-reference A52 is not a well formed sentence of the formal system
L. But if L is rich enough for arithmetic (e.g. ZFC) then Gödel numbering
and diagonalization can be used to overcome this worry (see Chow 1998,
Kritchman and Raz 2010, and Shaw 1958 for details). Of course, Gödel
used these devices to produce a liar type sentence (saying of itself ‘I am
not provable in L’) belonging to the formal system in order to prove its
incompleteness.9 So one might worry that what we have here is an another
form of the liar paradox.10 In broad a sense that is correct because, like
the liar sentence, the self-referential A52 quickly leads to contradiction by
backwards induction.
Take the case of j = 4. A52 implies (m = 5)→ ¬Pr[A52,m /∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}](m =
5). ButA52 andm /∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} implym = 5. So Pr[A52,m /∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}](m =
5) holds, and by modus tollens m 6= 5, establishing the base for the back-
wards induction. Next take the case of j = 3. A52 implies (m = 4) →
¬Pr[A52,m /∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}](m = 4). A52 also implies m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and, as
we have just seen, A52 implies m 6= 5. Thus, Pr[A52,m /∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}](m = 4),
and by modus tollens m 6= 4. Etc. eventuating in the contradiction (m ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5})&(m /∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}).
So if A52 is an accurate rendition of the surprise exam announcement then
the logicians have succeeded in producing paradox. And since the paradox
is in the form of an antinomy where none of the steps in reasoning is in-
valid, the resolution of the paradox is simply that the teacher has uttered
9For a technically correct statement of what the Gödel sentence says see Raatikainen
(2020).
10For a critical review of attempts to assimilate the surprise exam paradox to the liar,
sorites, Moore’s paradox, the lottery paradox and others see Sorensen (1988, Chapters 8
and 9).
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a contradiction– she seemed to be making a sensible announcement, but
taken as an assertion it is equivalent to X&¬X for any sentence X. Various
commentators have wanted to deny the antecedent: the teacher intended to
make an informative announcement so the principle of charity would suggest
that a different reading be given to her announcement. Another motivation
for wanting a different reading of the announcement is the strange sense of
‘know’embodied in A52. The students are deemed to know that the exam
is on, say, Friday if they can deduce that the exam is on Friday from A52
and the non-occurrence of the exam on the preceding days. But A52 is in-
consistent, leading Halpern and Moses to ask: “[C]an you really be said to
know something as a result of deducing it from inconsistent information?”
(1986, p. 184). This point prompts a subtle but crucial modification of A52
introduced by Kritchman and Raz (2010).
2.3 Gödel to the rescue (?)
Kritchman and Raz (2010) stick to a self-referential version of the surprise
exam announcement, but they propose to modify A52 to reflect the idea that
if the students know some evening that the exam is to be held the next day
then not only should they be able to prove it will be held the next day but
they should not be able to prove that it will be held any other day. With
this addendum the formalization of the surprise exam announcement then
becomes:
A53 : (m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})&∀0≤j≤4[(m = j + 1)→
¬{Pr[A53,m /∈ {0, ..., j}](m = j + 1)&∀1≤k≤5
k 6=j+1
¬Pr[A53,m /∈ {0, ..., j}](m = k)}]
Antinomy is avoided by this amendment. The j = 4 instance of A53
gives (m = 5) → ¬{Pr[A53,m /∈ {0, ..., 4}](m = 5)&∀1≤k≤4¬Pr[A53,m /∈
{0, ..., 4}](m = k)}. As with A52, A53 also implies Pr[A53,m /∈ {0, ..., 4}](m =
5). But to apply modus tollens to get m 6= 5 we also need to satisfy the
condition ∀1≤k≤4¬Pr[A53,m /∈ {0, ..., 4}](m = k). This condition holds iff the
the system L + A53 is consistent. So what follows from A
5
3 is not m 6= 5
but Con(L + A53) → (m 6= 5) (where Con(L + A53) ≡ ¬Pr[A53](0 = 1)).
If we could continue in this way to show that for the j = 3 case Con(L +
A53) → (m 6= 4) etc. then we would eventually get Con(L + A53) → (m /∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). And since A53 entails m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} the upshot is ¬Con(L
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+ A53). But as the reader can check, in the j = 3 case we cannot show without
the help of further assumptions that Con(L + A53)→ (m 6= 4) and, thus, the
backwards induction is halted. What further assumptions would enable the
backwards induction? Proving that Con(L + A53) would do the trick; but,
as Kritschman and Raz (2010, p. 1458) note, Gödel’s second incompleteness
theorem shows that Con(L + A53) is not provable in L + A
5
3.
One worry here is that whereas the A52 reading of the announcement
implies too much (it implies everything) the A53 reading implies too little; for
should not a satisfactory reading of the announcement imply that the exam
does not occur on Friday?11 But perhaps A53 is strong enough to account for
the students’beliefs about when the exam will take place. For example, the
logically adept students may reason as follows: ‘I have proved that A53 entails
Con(L + A53) → (m 6= 5) and, therefore, if I am justified in believing that
Con(L + A53) then I am justified in believing m 6= 5. And I am justified in
believing that Con(L + A53) since I have proved it in a system stronger than
L + A53. Thus, I am justified in believingm 6= 5. But A53 doesn’t entail Con(L
+ A53) → (m 6= i) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4; or at least I can’t prove the entailment,
and there seems to be no way to prove it short of proving ¬Con(L + A53),
which I have disproved. Hence, while I am justified in believing that the
exam will not be on Friday I am free to believe that it will occur any other
day.’ It is a further question whether or not the students can justifiably
believe A53 without reactivating the backwards induction.
12
This is all very interesting. But the fact that the teacher needs a PhD
in mathematical logic (and perhaps also a sadistic streak) to concoct self-
referential announcements of the A53 ilk, while the students need at least
an MA to understand what the teacher has announced, suggests moving on
to consider non-referential readings of the surprise exam announcement that
plausibly capture what was intended by the teacher and what was understood
by the students in, say, a freshman course on the rationalists.
3 Veering from the logical turn
I have three proposals for how to proceed. First, do not follow the logical
turn and replace knowledge with provability. The price to be paid for veering
from the logical turn is that the new route drives us into the controversies
11This is debatable; see Section 3.1 below.
12Questions of this kind will be considered below.
9
about how to understand the concept of knowledge as used in everyday and
scientific discourse. To lower the cost, construe the surprise exam paradox
as a paradox about justified belief. Whatever else is required for an agent to
know that a proposition is true it certainly includes justified belief; and to say
that the students are surprised by the exam day is to imply that the evening
before the exam they are not justified in believing that the exam will be on
the morrow. Justified belief is also a contested notion, but the contest is
easier to manage than for knowledge.13 Next, for Ij, the information known
to be true on the evening of day j, substitute Ej, the evidence available on
the evening of day j. This is a vague notion but still clear enough to make
progress. For example, E0, the evidence available on Sunday evening, may
consist of the memory that the teacher made a surprise exam announcement
on the preceding Friday; memories about the reliability of the teacher’s pro-
nouncements; and, perhaps, also the testimony of students who have taken
the course previous semesters. And if m > j then Ej includes the memory
that the exam has not occurred as of the evening of day j. These are only
examples, and an analysis of what counts as available evidence remains to
be given. I have no analysis to offer, so in what follows I will offer a tem-
plate for the surprise exam announcement. Different ways of filling in the
template will have different consequences for paradox. Finally, within this
framework I will investigate non-self-referential versions of the surprise exam
announcement.
3.1 A justified-belief version of announcement
Informally, the justified belief version of a non-self-referential surprise exam
announcement takes the form:
Attention students! There will be an exam next week on exactly
one of the days Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Fri-
day. And on the evening before the exam you will not be justified
in believing on the basis of the evidence then available to you that
the exam will be on the next day.
13Eventually I will offer a version of the surprise exam announcement that is not framed
in terms of knowledge or justified belief and, thereby, avoids wrangles about how to un-
derstand these notions.
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Using JB[Ej](X) to stand for the proposition that on the basis of the evidence
Ej available on the evening of day j the students are justified in believing
that X, the formalization of the announcement is
A54 : (m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})&∀0≤j≤4[(m = j + 1)→ ¬JB[Ej](m = j + 1)]
This formulation leaves much unsaid. If the exam has not taken place by
day j > 0, does the evidence of the students’memories justify them in believ-
ing that m /∈ {1, ..., j}? If so, reasoning about A54 should be supplemented
by the condition
S51 : (m > j > 1)→ JB[Ej](m /∈ {1, ..., j})
S51 can, and often is, understood as being part of the announcement, in






1 . Additionally, if E0
includes evidence that the teacher always carries out her intention to give
an exam– whether or not it is a surprise– then we may want to include a
second supplementary condition
S52 : JB[E0](m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
A reason for taking S52 to be part of the announcement itself is that, intu-
itively, the one-day version of the announcement is self-contradictory, which
it is not if construed as A14 or A
1
4. For those persuaded of this reasoning the









3.2 Rules of the game
Departing from the logical turn means departing from the clear rules of the
road for provability in standard logic. To analyze A54 for its potential to
generate paradox we need to know the rules for drawing inferences from
statements involving JB[...](...). Here I will consider some principles, variants
of which have been employed in the literature on the surprise exam. Before
starting it is well to be aware that drawing consequences from principles
of reasoning about justified belief that have no backing from a plausible
analysis of this concept poses a danger of generating disinformation rather
than illumination, a danger that has been widely ignored in the philosophical
literature. Nevertheless, it is worth spending some time to see how operating
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with the these and other principles used in the literature can generate paradox
since it may help to explain why it has been thought that the surprise exam
announcement harbors paradox.
Here are the principles to be considered:
JB1 : {JB[E ](X)&JB[E ](Y )} → JB[E ](X&Y )
JB2 : {JB[E ](X)&(`L X → Y )} → JB[E ](Y )
JB3 : {JB[E ](X)&(E ⊆ Ẽ)} → JB[Ẽ ](X)
Here L is a sound system of inference in which the non-self-referential an-
nouncement can be formulated. For the A54 formalization of the announce-
ment the predicate calculus suffi ces for L. But by sacrificing the compact
representation achieved in A54, L can be taken to be the sentential calcu-
lus, the drawback being that the representing sentential formula may spill
off the page for a multi-day version of the announcement. JB1 and JB2
say respectively that justified belief is closed under conjunction and logical
implication. JB3 is a no-loss principle for justification as evidence accu-
mulates. More typically in the literature the no-loss principle is stated as
no-loss of justified belief (or knowledge) over time. In effect this is covered
by JB3 if, as will be assumed here, the evidence an agent possesses does not
decrease over time. Of course, human agents do suffer memory loss, but such
human failings are being ignored here. One virtue of JB3 is that it covers
non-temporal variants of the paradox, such as Sorensen’s spatialed version.
In the literature one also finds in place of JB2
JB? : `L X → JB[E ](X)
JB?? : {JB[E ](X)&JB[E ](X → Y )} → JB[E ](Y )
from which JB2 can be derived. JB? is certainly acceptable. But, for reasons
that will emerge below, JB?? is arguably defective, and for this reason I will
work with JB2.14
No sooner are JB1−JB3 written down than questions arise. If X and Y
contain occurrences of JB[−](−) then arguably JB2 should be strengthened.
14JB1 and JB3 are also arguably defective. The fact that one strand of the literature
has been based on principles that are largely or wholly defective is notable. Still, let’s
proceed in the hope of learning something.
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Assume that the base logic L contains modus ponens and let L1 := L +
JB1, JB2, JB3 be the logic obtained from L by adding JB1−JB3 as axioms.
To say that JB1−JB3 are valid principles of reasoning about justified belief
is to say that the system L1 is sound, which prompts ratcheting JB2 up to
(JB2)2 : {JB[E ](X)&(`L1 X → Y )} → JB[E ](Y )
But again, if JB1, (JB2)2, and JB3 are valid principles, then it seems that
(JB2)2 should be strengthened to
(JB2)3 : {JB[E ](X)&(`L2 X → Y )} → JB[E ](Y )
where L2 := L1 + (JB2)2, etc.. What then is the logic in which entailments
of the surprise exam announcement are to be drawn? With Ln := Ln−1 +
(JB2)n, n = 2, 3, ..., one could try to define a “limit logic”as n→∞. This
option will not be pursued here. The alternative is to say that there is no
fixed surprise exam logic per se; rather, the relevant logic is determined by
context: it is Ln∗ with n∗ fixed by however many iterations of JB2 are needed
to do the desired derivation. Since a proof can contain only a finite number
of steps one does not have to worry about defining a “limit logic”because
n∗ is always finite. In the cases considered below n∗ is small. This is messy,
but in the absence of a reductive analysis of justified belief that allows the
elimination of occurrences of JB[−](−) all one can do is soldier on, hoping
that illumination about the surprise exam will emerge.
3.3 Paradox avoided







1 , does not produce an antinomy; indeed, as the reader
can check, this version of the announcement does not even entail in any Ln
the base case, m 6= 5, needed for backwards induction.









does secure the entailment. To see this consider the case of j = 4. The
condition S51 reads (m > 4) → JB[E4](m /∈ {1, ..., 4}), and applying JB3
to S52 gives JB[E4](m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}).15 Combining these by JB1 and
JB2 results in (m > 4) → (JB[E4]((m /∈ {1, ..., 4})&(m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})).
15Recall that it is being assumed here that evidence is strictly accumulative over time
so that if l ≤ m then El ⊆ Em.
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Since `L (m /∈ {1, ..., 4})&(m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) → (m = 5) the applica-
tion of JB2 yields (m > 4) → JB[E4](m = 5). Assume for reductio that
m = 5. Then by modus ponens JB[E4](m = 5). Also from A54 for j = 4 we
have (m = 5) → ¬JB[E4](m = 5), and using the reductio assumption and
modus ponens gives ¬JB[E4](m = 5), contradicting the previously derived
JB[E4](m = 5). Hence, `L1 (A4&S51&S52)→ (m 6= 5).
The next thing to notice is that even with the help of the supplementary
S52 backwards induction is not engaged. Proceeding as in the case of j = 4,
the j = 3 instances of S51 and S
5
2 yield (m > 3) → JB[E3](m ∈ {4, 5}), and
the j = 3 instance of A54 gives (m = 4)→ ¬JB[E3](m = 4). So assuming for
reductio that m = 4 produces JB[E3](m ∈ {4, 5}) and ¬JB[E3](m = 4). To
get a contradiction with ¬JB[E3](m = 4) so as to conclude by modus tollens
that m 6= 4 requires also that JB[E3](m 6= 5). It as previously established
that `L1 (A4&S51&S52) → (m 6= 5), but to get from here to JB[E3](m 6= 5)
requires additional assumptions beyond S52 and/or additional principles of
inference.
Let’s pause to reflect on what we have learned.
3.4 The YouTube version: ‘First we rule out Friday...’
Recall the seductive reasoning of the quick-and-dirty version of the surprise
exam paradox: ‘First we rule out Friday as the exam day because an exam
on that day would not be a surprise. Second, having ruled out Friday we can
rule out Thursday on similar grounds. Etc.’ If the above analysis is on track
then we can see why both moves in the quick-and-dirty version are too quick







first step falters because the truth of the surprise exam announcement does
not “rule out”Friday without the help of an additional assumption about
what the students are justified in believing on Thursday evening– e.g. that
they are justified in believing m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. This seems to be the main
point of Quine’s (1953) dismissal of the (non-self-referential) surprise exam
paradox as a “so-called paradox.” But quick dismissal is not warranted if
the additional assumption can be a reasonable one, as may be the case here.
Indeed, S52 seems so reasonable that that it is sometimes taken to be built
into the announcement, and if so then Friday is ruled out, at least if the Ln










m 6= 5.16 Quine might have added that still further assumptions about what
the students are justified in believing and/or still further inference principles
are needed in order to move the backwards induction off the base case and
towards antinomy. The status of these further assumptions and rules is our
next topic.
Before moving on it is well to emphasize that the above discussion was
conducted under the presupposition that JB1− JB3 are valid principles for
reasoning about justified belief. In fact JB1 and JB3 are suspect for reasons
to be elaborated below. But faulting one or both of them was not needed to
dissolve the surprise exam paradox on the current reading of the announce-
ment. What is striking is that, contrary to first appearances, it is not easy
to generate paradox from the non-referential surprise exam announcement
even when arguably defective principles of reasoning are used.17 Why then
is the reasoning in the quick-and-dirty version of the paradox so seductive?
An obvious culprit is an over-interpretation of the sense in which Friday is
“ruled out”as the exam day, leading to a misapplication of backwards in-
duction. The truth of the surprise exam announcement, read as A
5
4, does
“rule out”Friday in the sense that if A
5
4 is true then the exam cannot be
held on Friday. But this does not authorize the students to assume m 6= 5
on Wednesday evening so as to “rule out” Thursday. Such an authoriza-
tion is provided by the self-referential version A52, eventuating in a genuine
antinomy. Perhaps those seduced by the the quick-and-dirty version of the




4 Paradox and puzzle redux









true. Can the students justifiably believe on Sunday that it is true? Some
additions to the principles JB1−JB3 that are supposed to govern reasoning
about justified belief entail a negative answer. Let’s work our way towards





and JB[E0](A54&S51&S52) are both true. In the preceding section we saw that
16A version of this point was part of Ayer’s (1973) critical response to Quine (1953).
17We will see shortly that faulting the defective principles is needed to resolve more
elaborate versions of the paradox.
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`L1 A54&S51&S52 → (m 6= 5). Using the first reductio assumption and modus
ponens yield the base case, m 6= 5, for backwards induction. Furthermore,
the assumption of JB[E0](A54&S51&S52) allows the backwards induction to
engage. In L2 combining `L1 A54&S51&S52 → (m 6= 5) and the second reductio
assumption, JB[E0](A54&S51&S52), yields JB[E0](m 6= 5), and from thence
using JB3 we arrive at JB[E3](m 6= 5). To repeat what was found above,
the j = 3 instances of S51 and S
5
2 yield (m > 3) → JB[E3](m ∈ {4, 5}), and
combining this with JB[E3](m 6= 5) by JB1 and JB2 produces (m > 3) →
JB[E3](m = 4). The j = 3 instance of A54 gives (m = 4)→ ¬JB[E3](m = 4).
Hence, if m = 4 then JB[E3](m = 4)&¬JB[E3](m = 4), and so m 6= 4.
So far so good. But the backwards induction falters in the next round.







2)&JB[E0](A54&S51&S52))→ (m /∈ {4, 5}). If we had the addi-
tional assumption that JB[E0](JB[E0](A54&S51&S52)) then this could be com-
bined by JB1 with JB[E0](A54&S51&S52) to get JB[E0]((A54&S51&S52)&JB[E0](A54&S51&S52)),
and then in L3 an application of (JB2)3 yields JB[E0](m /∈ {4, 5}). From
here it is smooth sailing to the conclusion that m 6= 3. The completion
of the final two rounds of the backwards induction requires even more as-
sumptions involving more iterated applications of the JB[−](−) operator.
Alternatively, to avoid having to add an additional assumption at each new
step– which would certainly become tedious in a generalized multi-day ver-
sion of the paradox– it would suffi ce to adopt one new inference principle
JB4 : JB[E ](X)→ JB[E ](JB[E ](X))
and modify the Ln appropriately to incorporate JB4. This is the course I
will follow in the remainder of this section.
To summarize, what has been shown so far is that, assuming that in-





2 is true then the students cannot be justified in believing




2 and JB[E0](A54&S51&S52) together
entail a contradiction in Ln. We can now establish a stronger result: If the









4 is true then the students cannot be justified in believing on Sunday
that A
5









1 → m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} the assumption JB[E0](A54&S51) and
an application of JB2 give JB[E0](m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}), which is just S52 ; and
from thence by JB4 we get JB[E0](S52). Then combining JB[E0](S52) and
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JB[E0](A54&S51) by JB1 results in JB[E0](A54&S51&S52). The penultimate con-
clusion is that the combination of A54&S
5





2 and that JB[E0](A54&S51&S52). Now we can employ the result
of the previous paragraph to get the upshot that the combination of A54&S
5
1
and JB[E0](A54&S51) entails a contradiction in Ln.
The knowledge version of this result is simpler. Let K[E ](X) stand for X
is known on the basis of E . Substituting K[E ](X) for JB[E ](X) in A54 gives
the knowledge version of the announcement:
KA
5
4 : (m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})&∀0≤j≤4[(m = j + 1)→ ¬K[Ej](m = j + 1)]
And under the substitution the supplementary conditions become
KS
5
1 : (m > j > 1)→ K[Ej](m /∈ {1, ..., j})
KS
5
2 : K[E0](m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})
Suppose that inferences about knowledge are governed by the knowledge
analogs K1−K4 of JB1− JB4. Knowledge also obeys another principle
K5 : K[E ](X)→ X
since K5 is nothing but the codification of the truism that knowledge implies
truth. Suppose that the appropriate logics for carrying out inferences infer-
ence about knowledge are KLn, which are defined analogously to the Ln with
the principles JB1−JB4 replaced by their knowledge analogs K1−K4 plus
K5. By K5, if K[E0](KA54&KS51) is assumed then KA54&KS51 doesn’t have to
be separately assumed; and transcribing the the above results for justified
belief shows that K[E0](KA54&KS51) produces antinomy in a KLn. Results
of this type using somewhat different principles governing K[E ](X) can be
found in the literature (e.g. Harrison 1969, McLelland and Chihara 1975,
Chihara 1985, and Sorensen 1988, pp. 289-290).
These results deserve to be called paradoxes or at least puzzles since
intuition suggests that nothing prevents the students on Sunday either from
knowing that the surprise exam announcement is true or from being justified
in believing the announcement is true if it is indeed true. The resolution of
this puzzle favored by many commentators is to reject the KK principle
K4 : K[E ](X)→ K[E ](K[E ](X))
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and, by implication, the JBJB principle JB4 (see for example Harrison 1969
and McLelland and Chihara 1975, 1985). However, this resolution is not fully
satisfying. Prima facie, self-reflective epistemologists in possession of correct
theories of knowledge and justified belief and self-consciously applying these
theories to interesting cases they encounter (such as the surprise exam) will
satisfy K4 and JB4. It is puzzling that these enlightened epistemologists
are unable to know that or justifiably believe that the surprise exam an-
nouncement is true while their less enlightened brethren can. Perhaps there
is something about the surprise exam case that allows enlightened epistemol-
ogists to know or be justified in believing the announcement but not to know
that they know and not to be justified in believing that they are justified in
believing. But that would need to be explained.
I will explore the option of resolving the paradox by rejecting one of the
other principles entertained above. But first a few words about blindspots.
4.1 Blindspots
A blindspot for an agent is a contingent proposition that is epistemically
inaccessible to that agent. More precisely, a contingent proposition X is a
blind spot for an agent whose available evidence is E just in case, on the
basis of E , the agent cannot know that X (knowledge blindspot) or cannot
be justified in believing X (justification blindspot), where “cannot”means
on pain of contradiction.18 To illustrate, consider the one-day knowledge
version KA14 of the surprise exam announcement. It boils down to
KA
1
4 : (m = 1)&¬K[E0](m = 1)








4 reduces to KA
1
4 be-
cause KS11 is vacuous.
19) But K[E0](A14) is impossible, at least if knowledge
obeys K5 and distributes across conjunction, i.e.
K6 : K[E ](X&Y )→ (K[E ](X)&K[E ](Y ))
(K6 is redundant in the presence ofK2.) Assume for reductio thatK[E0]((m =
1)&¬K[E0](m = 1)). By K6 we get K[E0](m = 1) and K[E0](¬K[E0](m =
18The notion of epistemic blindspots was introduced by Roy Sorensen (1982, 1984).
Differing definitions of blindspots are offered in Sorensen (1988).
19However, KA
1
4 = [(m = 1)&¬K[E0](m = 1)&K[E0](m = 1)] is flatly self-contradictory.
18
1)), and from the latter we get ¬K[E0](m = 1) by K5. Thus, KA14 is a







2 is a knowledge blindspot for the students on Sunday evening
in the proposed knowledge logics.
By contrast the one-day version A14 : (m = 1)&¬JB[E0](m = 1) of the











4) is not a justification blindspot– JB[E0]((m = 1)&¬JB[E0](m = 1))







2 is a conditional justification blindspot; for, as we saw above, if
A
5
4 is true then JB[E0](A
5
4) cannot be true in the proposed justified belief
logics.
Seeing how blind spots can form helps to remove some of the air of paradox
surrounding them. But erasing the purported conditional and unconditional
epistemic blindspots for the surprise exam can only be accomplished by iden-
tifying a false premise or a faulty principle of reasoning, the removal of which
restores epistemic accessibility. In the following section I focus suspicion on
JB1 and JB3 and their knowledge counterparts.21
5 Puzzle dissolved, blindspots erased (?)
Of the principles JB1, (JB2)n, and JB3 the least suspect are the (JB2)n.
They can fail for students who are not good at logic or simply fail to put two-
and-two together, but to cite such failures is an uninteresting way of escaping
paradox, especially if paradox is the reward for becoming logic savvy. As will
20A first person utterance of A14 : (m = 1)&¬JB[E0](m = 1) has the form of ‘X but I am
not justified in believing X’. It has an odd ring not unlike the odd ring of the sentences
discussed in Moore’s paradox, e.g. ‘X but I don’t believe X’. For a discussion of attempts
to assimilate the surprise exam paradox see Sorensen (1988). A first person utterance
of JB[E0]((m = 1)&¬JB[E0](m = 1)) sounds even odder. Not only does it sound odd
but applying JB1, JB2, and JB4 to it leads to absurdity: by JB1, JB2, and JB4,
JB[E0]((m = 1)&¬JB[E0](m = 1)) entails JB[E0](JB[E0](m = 1)&¬JB[E0](m = 1)) and,
thus, by JB2 it entails JB[E0](Y ) for any Y whatsoever.
21I of course agree with Sorensen that blind spots are implicated in the surprise exam
paradox and other epistemic paradoxes. But I do not agree that blindspots lead to a
resolution of the paradoxes– they are a statement of the problem rather than part of the
resolution; and they get erased by a resolution that consists of identifying a false premise
or an invalid step of reasoning that produce the paradox; but see Sorensen (1988, pp.
328-343).
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be discussed below, on some analyses of justified belief JB1 can fail on more
substantive grounds; but these grounds do not seem to apply in the present
case. For instance, the use of JB1 to combine JB[E4](m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) and
JB[E4](m /∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) to give JB[E4]((m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})&(m /∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}))
and, thereby, JB[E4](m = 5) seems defensible. As a general principle JB3 is
so glaringly defective that it is embarrassing to write it down: an agent may
be justified in believing X on the basis of the evidence E initially available
to her, but as additional evidence becomes available the initial evidence in
favor of X can be undermined or counterbalanced so that she is no longer
justified in believing X on the basis of the total accumulated evidence Ẽ ⊃ E
available to her. Various commentators have used a rejection of JB3 and the
concomitant justification loss that occurs as the days pass without an exam
as a means of avoiding the present form of paradox (see, for example, Wright
and Sudbury 1977). What needs to be shown is not just that JB3 fails as
a general principle– which can be taken as a given– but that as applied to




2 by itself nor
in conjunction with JB[E0](A54&S51&S52) produces a contradiction and, thus,
why there are no resulting justification blindspots.
In establishing the base case, m 6= 5, for the backwards induction the
main role for JB3 is going from JB[E0](m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) to JB[E4](m ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}), which is defensible; indeed, unless between Sunday and Thurs-
day evening the students have acquired evidence that the teacher has aban-
doned her intention to give an exam, it seems that if they are justified in
believing on Sunday that there will be an exam, surprise or not, then they
are still justified in believing it on Thursday evening.










2 entailsm 6= 5, the assumption JB[E0](A54&S51&S52)
can used to get JB[E0](m 6= 5) without employing JB3. But JB3 is needed in
going from JB[E0](m 6= 5) to JB[E3](m 6= 5). What is illegitimate with this
use of JB3? Well, one might say, the reason the students initially believed





but after no exam on Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday that initial belief is





2 . If this critique of JB3 succeeds in undermining the
engagement of the backwards induction it would follow that the students






A24 : (m ∈ {1, 2})&∀0≤j≤1[(m = j + 1)→ ¬JB[Ej](m = j + 1)]
and S21 and S
2
2 are the two-day versions of S1 and S2:
S21 : (m = 2)→ JB[E1](m 6= 1)
S22 : JB[E0](m ∈ {1, 2})
Without begging the question of the validity of the principles JB1, (JB2)n, and
JB3 this claim can only be adjudicated if one has at hand an account of when
an agent is warranted in claiming justified belief on the basis of the evidence
available to her.
With an analysis in hand of justified belief, supplying necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for an agent to be justified in believing X on the basis of
evidence E , the principles governing reasoning with justified belief are pre-
cisely those that flow from the analysis, no more and no less. Of course, a
tug of war commences if these rules conflict with the rules one initially thinks
ought to govern reasoning about justified belief, and deciding the winner can
be a matter of some nicety. There is another reason for wanting an analysis
of justified belief. A fully satisfying resolution of the surprise exam paradoxes
and puzzles is not achieved by showing how formal contradiction is avoided.
One also would like to know how the teacher can set a surprise exam and how
the students can be justified in initially believing that they will be surprised,
even though that justification may fade as the week progresses with no exam
having taken place. In the following section I will offer a trial account of
justified belief and test to see whether it meets this challenge.
6 How to set a surprise exam, or rather how
to set a probably surprising exam
6.1 Justified belief
In the present section I will explore the idea that an agent is justified in
believing X on the basis of evidence E just in case P (X/E) ≥ p∗ > 1
2
, where
P (X/E) is the agent’s rational degree of belief in X conditional on E , and
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p∗ is some chosen cut-off value. In a later section I will discuss some of the
shortcomings of this account of justified belief; but whatever its shortcomings
it has the virtue of illustrating the kinds of considerations that must be dealt
with if the surprise exam paradox is to be put to rest.
On this analysis our five-day justified belief version of the surprise exam
announcement becomes
Â54 : (m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5})&∀0≤j≤4[(m = j + 1)→ ¬(P (m = j + 1)/Ej) ≥ p∗)]
and the supplementary principles become
Ŝ51 : (m > j > 0)→ P (m /∈ {1, ..., j})/Ej) ≥ p∗
Ŝ52 : P ((m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}))/E0) ≥ p∗
6.2 The inference principles
The inference principles for justified belief considered in Section 3.1 above
do not fare well on the cut-off analysis. The conjunction principle JB1
fails since whatever the value of the cut-off p∗, as long as it is strictly less
than 1, P (X/E) ≥ p∗ and P (Y/E) ≥ p∗ do not imply P (X&Y/E) ≥ p∗.
And the no-loss principle JB3 fails miserably since since P (X/E) ≥ p∗
does not imply P (X/Ẽ) ≥ p∗ for E ⊆ Ẽ . The problem with the JBJB
principle JB4 is not that it fails on the cut-off analysis of justified belief
but that the cut-off analysis is stymied in providing an evaluation. Such an
evaluation would involve evaluating expressions of the form P (P (X/E) ≥
p∗/E) = ?, but the domains of ordinary credence functions do not contain
sentences expressing propositions about credences. This might seem to bode
ill for assessing whether the students can justifiably believe the surprise exam
announcement. I will return to this issue shortly.
Not only does the cut—off analysis serve as a wrecking ball but it also has
the more positive virtue of lending itself to an explanation of how the teacher
can set a surprise exam.
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6.3 Setting the exam22
Here I model the students as Bayesian agents who approach the surprise
exam paradox with open minded priors; specifically, they assign non-zero,
but perhaps widely divergent, priors to the relevant propositions about the
to-be-announced exam. But because of two further assumptions their pos-
terior degrees of belief quickly coalesce: first, when the teacher makes the
surprise exam announcement Â54 she also tells the students that the day of
the exam will be chosen by a quantum randomizer, and the students take
this pronouncement on board; second, the students conform to David Lewis’
Principle Principle, to wit, if E(x) is the evidence that the objective chance
of X is x then P (X/E(x)) = x (see Lewis 1980). Then on Sunday evening
the student’s rational degree of belief P (m = i/E0), conditional on the ev-




for each i, per Lewis’Principle Principal. Let us also assume that the
students’ credences obey the supplementary principles Ŝ51 and Ŝ
5
2 . And to
simplify matters, let us guarantee the satisfaction of these conditions by set-
ting P ((m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}))/E0) = 1 and P (m /∈ {1, ..., j})/Ej) = 1 for j > 0.
Then P ((m = 1))/E1) = 0 if the exam does not occur on Monday. And if
the exam does not occur on Monday I will assume that, barring additional
evidence that favors one of the remaining days, the rational redistribution
of the 1/5 degree of belief initially assigned to Monday is to split it equally
among the remaining days so that P (m = i/E1) =
1
4
for 2 ≤ i ≤ 5. Proceed-
ing in this way, the rational conditional degrees of belief on successive days
are tabulated as
22In this section I am relying on Ned Hall’s (1999) proposal for how to set a surprise
exam. For another proposal on how to set a surprise exam see Sober (1998).
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where the entry in the ith column and jth row is P (m = i/Ej), 1 ≤ i ≤ 5,
0 ≤ j ≤ 4, and Ej is the evidence available to the students on the evening of
day j.
Call day i a surprise day if, on the basis of the evidence available on
the evening of day i − 1, the students are not justified in believing that
m = i. On the present interpretation of justified belief this means that
P (m = i/Ei−1) < p∗. As an illustration set p∗ = 0.8. Then the surprise days
are Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. The teacher’s method for
setting the exam day is not infallible in producing a surprise exam– one-fifth
of the time it will misfire because the exam will fall on the non-surprise day
Friday.23 What can be said in favor of the proposed randomizing method of
setting the exam this: If it is used then four-fifths of the time the exam occurs
on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday, in which case the students





23Can there be an infallible method for setting a surprise exam in the sense that in every
possible application of the method the students are surprised? Prima facie it seems not for
any form of the exam announcement that implies the exam will not be on Friday. For if
such an infallible method were applied then necessarily never on F an exam, so the five-day
exam window is reduced to four, making the the five-day announcement equivalent to a
four-day announcement. The same consideration applies to the four-day announcement,
making it equivalent to a three-day announcement. Etc. However, one knows from the
history of the surprise exam announcement that superficially attractive arguments turn
out to be fallacious. This one may turn out to fall into that category.
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6.4 Blind spots again
Enquiring about justification blindspots on the current analysis of justified
belief does not produce an immediate response; for on the cut-off analysis
evaluating expressions like JB[E0](Â54&Ŝ51) and JB[E0](Â54&Ŝ51&Ŝ52) requires
evaluating expressions of the form P (Â54&Ŝ
5
1/E0) =? and P (Â54&Ŝ51&Ŝ52/E0) =
?. But for reasons explained above the domains of ordinary credence func-









seeming inability to deliver a verdict on matters we want to settle is not fatal
to the cut—off analysis. What one wants to know is whether the students
can justifiably believe on Sunday both that there will be an exam on one of
the appointed days and that the day of the exam will be a surprise. In the
scheme described above this is functionally equivalent to asking whether the
students can justifiably believe on Sunday both that there will be an exam on
Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday and that the exam will
fall on one of the surprise days Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday.
The scheme above demonstrates that this question can be answered in the
affi rmative; for according to this scheme, on Sunday their rational credence
in the conjunction of these two propositions reaches the chosen cut-off value
of 0.8 for justified belief.
6.5 Raising the bar
In the above I rigged the choice of p∗ to get the result I wanted. This rigging
was justified in order to give a proof-of-concept, but it brings into question
how robust the scheme is. Setting the bar higher for justified belief changes
the conclusions of the analysis. Suppose, for example, the cut-off is set to
p∗ = 0.9 rather than to 0.8. The surprise days are still Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday, and Thursday. But on Sunday the rational conditional degree of
belief that the exam will occur on a surprise day is only 0.8 which falls below
the cut-off value, so on Sunday the students are not justified in believing
that the exam will fall on a surprise day. This can be overcome by increasing
the number N of possible exam days and using a quantum randomizer to
give equal weight to each of the N days. The number of surprise days is
now N − 1, and on Sunday the rational degree of belief that the exam will
occur on a surprise day is
N − 1
N
, which can be made to as close to unity as
desired by making N suffi ciently large. In this way no matter how high the
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bar for justified belief is set, as long as p∗ is strictly less than 1, the bar can
be cleared by making the number of possible exam days suffi ciently large.
Raising the bar for justified belief simultaneously lowers the bar for sur-
prise if the exam is defined to be a surprise when on the evening of the day
before the exam the students are not justified in believing that the exam will
be the next day, and on the present analysis this means that the rational
conditional degree of belief that the exam will take place the next day is less
than p∗. If p∗ is close to unity the analysis does not yield a very appealing
notion of surprise. Thus, one might want to redo the analysis with a higher
bar for surprise. In the present setting this amounts to counting an exam on
day i as surprising iff the rational conditional degree of belief on the evening
of day i− 1 that the exam will take place on i is less than or equal to some
0 ≤ s∗ < 1
2
. I will return to this suggestion in Section 8.
Finally it is worth seeing how the present analysis of justified belief treats
the two-day version Â24 of the surprise exam announcement. Whatever ob-
jective chances p1 and p2, p1+p2 = 1, are set by the quantum mechanism for
Monday and Tuesday respectively, if the credences obey the two-day versions
of the constraints Ŝ21 and Ŝ
2
2 then the rational conditional degrees of belief




The only possible surprise day is Monday, and if Monday is to be a surprise
day then p1 must be less than or equal to p∗, the minimum required for
justified belief, in which case the students are not justified in believing on
Sunday that the exam will take place on a surprise day. In that sense, on
the cut-off analysis of justified belief Â24 is a conditional blindspot.
7 Subsidiary paradoxes and puzzles
The cut-off analysis of justified belief has the virtue of illustrating some
conceptual points and in showing how the mystery of the surprise exam
paradox can be drained. But it is now time to consider some unattractive
features of the analysis.
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7.1 The lottery paradox
As already noted, the cut-off analysis violates the conjunction principle JB1:
the conjunction of P (X/E)≥ p∗ and P (Y/E)≥ p∗ does not imply P (X&Y/E)
≥ p∗. The failure of this implication is at the heart of the lottery paradox
which Henry Kyburg (1961) framed in terms of acceptance rather than justi-
fied belief. Here are three candidate principles governing rational acceptance
of a proposition:
RA1: If it is rational for an agent to accept X and and rational
for her to accept Y then it is rational for her to accept X&Y .
RA2: It is rational for an agent to accept X if her rational de-
gree of belief in X conditional on the evidence available to her is
suffi ciently close to 1.
RA3: It is not rational to accept a self-contradictory X.
To show that RA1−RA3 are in conflict consider the set up exploited in the
previous section: a lottery with N tickets with one ticket to be chosen the
winner by means of a randomizing device that gives equal weight to each
ticket. Then for an agent cognizant of how the lottery operates the rational
degree of belief that any given ticket is not the winner is 1− 1
N
, and this
degree of belief can be made as close to 1 as desired by choosingN suffi ciently
large. Thus, whatever cut-off value is set in RA2 (as long as it is strictly less
than 1), the agent is rational in accepting the proposition X(n) that ticket
#n is a loser for every 1 ≤ n ≤ N . By RA1 the agent is rational in accepting
the conjunction &1≤n≤NX(n). But this conjunction is a contradiction (given
the background information), violating RA3.
The lottery paradox can be resolved by rejecting the cut-off condition
RA2 for rational acceptance or, more radically, by giving up on the idea of
rational acceptance tout court in favor of degree of acceptance. Kyburg did
not take either of these options but instead rejected the conjunction principle
RA1 for acceptance.
7.2 Justified belief and the cut-off analysis
A number of commentators have wanted to retain the conjunction principle
JB1 for justified belief (for example, see Ryan 1996, Evine 1999, Nelkin 2000,
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and Douven 2002), which obliges them to reject a probability cut-off analysis
of justification– high rational degree of belief may be necessary for justified
belief; but if the cut-off for degree of belief is set short of 1 by the tiniest ep-
silon it cannot be deemed suffi cient without generating inconsistency. [Aside:
For a (countably) infinite lottery setting the probability cut-off to 1 does not
avoid the problem, at least not if the probability measure is merely finitely
additive rather than countably additive. For there are mere finitely additive
probability measures on the positive integers that assign probability 0 to each
of the integers. If such a measure is generated by the mechanism for choosing
the winning ticket then the probability is 1 that ticket #n is a loser for each
0 < n ≤ ∞. However, there is reason to think that such a mechanism cannot
be realized by quantum mechanics. Most physicists assume, either explicitly
or implicitly, that physically realizable quantum states are normal, and such
states generate countably additive probability measures. Some of the reasons
in support of this assumption are discussed in Earman (2020).]
Suppose, however, that JB1 is rejected, as it must be on the cut-off
analysis of justified belief, mirroring Kyburg’s rejection of the conjunction
principle RA1 for rational acceptance. It is then not outright inconsistent
for an agent to assert of each and every lottery ticket that she is justified in
believing that it is a loser and also that she is justified in believing that some
ticket is a winner. But the dual assertion has a distinctly odd ring, and for an
obvious reason: the speaker is revealing that she is operating with a notion of
justification which guarantees that, in certain situations, she will deem herself
to be justified in believing a false proposition. This is so for the probability
cut-off analysis of justified belief in the lottery case. Given any cut-off value
p∗ < 1, the number N of lottery tickets can be chosen so that P (X(n)/E) ≥
p∗ for each 1 ≤ n ≤ N and, thus on the cut-offanalysis, JB[E ](X(n)) for each
1 ≤ n ≤ N . And whatever the number N of lottery tickets and whatever the
cut-off value p∗, P (∃1≤n≤N¬X(n)/E) = 1 so that JB[E ](∃1≤n≤N¬X(n)) on
the cut-off analysis. This feature does not automatically disqualify the cut-
off analysis– that judgement depends on epistemic goals and a comparison
of how well the cut-off analysis vs. other accounts of justification serve those
goals (see Douven 2008); but it does seem that the proponent of the cut-off
analysis needs to do some special pleading.
These considerations make me inclined either to reject a probability cut-
off analysis for justified belief (and for acceptance as well) or else to abandon
the unqualified notion of justified belief (and acceptance) in favor of degree of
justification (and degree of acceptance). Additionally, the lottery example re-
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inforced by the famous Gettier examples (see Gettier 1963) indicate that the
probability cut-off analysis does not produce the kind of justification needed
to sustain a knowledge claim. In the lottery example the high probability
that a given ticket is a loser does not sustain the holder’s claim to know that
her ticket is a loser– or so many commentators would judge.24 If you are
sick of the lottery example consider Willard who uses the probability cut-off
analysis of justification. He believes that X, and he proclaims that his belief
is justified because given his available evidence E his rational degree of belief
in X, P (X/E), is very high, say, 0.999. (Willard’s rational credence need
not be derived from the statistical probability of a random lottery drawing;
it might instead derive from the evidence of Willard’s own perceptions and
testimony of eyewitnesses.) Willard does not believe that Y , which is incom-
patible with X; indeed, Willard’s P (Y/E) is very low, say, 0.0001. It is a
theorem of probability that if P (X/E) ≥ p then P (X ∨ Y/E) ≥ p, and so
Willard proclaims that he is justified in believing that X ∨ Y . Now suppose
that X ∨ Y is true so that Willard has justified true belief according to the
cut—off analysis of justification. All of this is compatible with supposing that
X ∨ Y is true because X is false and Y is true. Under these conditions can
we credit Willard’s claim to know that X ∨Y is true because he has justified
true belief? Arguably not since his justification for believing X ∨ Y flows
through through the false X which (on the cut-off analysis) he is justified
in believing rather than through the true ¬Y which he is also justified in
believing.25
These examples also cast doubt on the wisdom of framing the surprise
exam paradox in terms of knowledge or justified belief. This framing implies
that the criterion of surprise is that on the evening before exam the students
do not know or are not justified in believing (in a sense that supports a
knowledge claim) that the exam will be on the morrow. What the above
examples show is that by this criterion being surprised that X is true is
24Olin (1983) takes the surprise exam paradox and the lottery paradox to show that
strong support by the available total evidence is not suffi cient for justified belief. In
another context Williamson (1996) holds that probabilistic evidence forX does not warrant
asserting that X but only asserting that X is probable; see section 8.1 below.
25Sometimes the moral drawn from the Gettier examples is that knowledge is not just
justified true belief– some fourth element is required. Other times the moral is said to
be that the kind of justification required to maintain the knowledge-as-justified-true-belief
slogan has to be more than merely having strong evidence in favor of the proposition– in
particular strong evidence in the form of high rational degree of belief.
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compatible with having a high rational degree of belief that X is true– the
opposite of being surprised that X in any ordinary sense.
Is there a plausible way of construing the surprise exam announcement
that does not entangle the resolution of the paradox with the unsettled wran-
gles of what constitutes knowledge and justified belief?
8 A student friendly version of the surprise
exam announcement
When the students say they were surprised by the exam day the most plau-
sible construal of their pronouncement is not that they didn’t know or were
not justified in believing that the exam would be on the morrow– at least not
in a sense of knowledge or justification that generates debate in the philo-
sophical literature. They simply mean that the exam was unexpected. If
pressed to make “unexpected”more precise, they would probably agree that
this means that on the night before the exam their rational degree of belief
that the exam would be given the following day was low. How low? There
is a grey area here, but if the value of the degree of belief is pushed suffi -
ciently low the students will agree that they were surprised. Let v1 be such
a value (the precise numerical value won’t matter to what follows). This
notion of surprise satisfies a conjunction principle: taking Sur[E ](•) to mean
that P (•/E) < v1, if Sur[E ](X) and Sur[E ](Y ) then Sur[E ](X&Y ) since if
P (X/E) < v1 and P (X/E) < v1 then P (X&Y/E) < v1. And there is nothing
untowards about asserting, before the drawing in a lottery, of each and every
lottery ticket that one would be surprised if that ticket is the winner; indeed,
to proclaim otherwise would be irrational.
If no exam occurs on days 1, ..., j and the students’memories are not
failing they may say on the evening of day j that they know or are justified
in believing that an exam has not taken place so far. But I doubt that
they mean this in any sense of knowledge or justified belief that excites
philosophical controversy. Rather, they simply mean that they have high
confidence that no exam has taken place. If pressed further to explain “high”




much above? There is a grey area here, but if the value of the degree of belief
is pushed suffi ciently high the students will agree that at this level they are
confident. Let v2 be such a value (the precise numerical value will not matter
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in what follows). As with cut-off analysis of justified belief, this notion of
confidence does not satisfy a conjunction principle (if v2 < 1): Con[E ](Y ) and
Con[E ](Z) does not imply Con[E ](Y&Z) since P (Y/E) ≥ v2 and P (Z/E) ≥
v2 does not imply P (Y&Z/E) ≥ v2. But there is no awkwardness about this
failure of the conjunction principle for Con. In the lottery case, for example,
there is nothing untowards about proclaiming before the drawing one that
is confident of each and every ticket that it will not be the winner; indeed,
in a lottery with a suffi ciently large number of tickets to proclaim otherwise
would be irrational. Whatever the exact values of v1 set for Sur and v2 for
Con, as long as v2 > v1, Con[E ](X) implies ¬Sur[E ](X).
Using Sur and Con a student friendly formulation of a N -day surprise
examination would have the form
AN5 : (m ∈ {1, ..., N})&∀0≤j≤N−1[(m = j + 1)→ Sur[Ej](m = j + 1)]
and the N -day analogs of the supplementary conditions are
S̃N1 : (m > j > 1)→ Con[Ej](m /∈ {1, ..., j})
S̃N2 : Con[E0](m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N})
A surprise day i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is now defined as a day such that
P (m = i/Ei−1) < v1 (the cut-off value for surprise).
Suppose that the exam day is chosen by a random mechanism that gives
equal weight to each of the N days and that the students’degrees evolve per
the sort of schedule laid out in Section 5. Then (i) S̃N1 is satisfied because
for m > j > 0, P (m /∈ {1, ..., j}/Ej) = 0; and whatever the choice of v1
for Sur and v2 for Con, there is a suffi ciently large N such that AN5 is true
if the random mechanism chooses a surprise day for the exam. This is all
compatible with satisfying S̃N2 by making P ((m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}))/E0) = 1.
And (ii) on Sunday the students can be confident the exam will fall on a
surprise day. That confidence will wain as the week progress without an
exam. But that confidence loss engenders no paradox; indeed, this waning
confidence is what avoids paradox since it goes hand in hand with the rise
in the expectation that the exam will occur the following day. When that
expectation rises to the level of v1 the backwards induction is halted.
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8.1 The price the teacher pays for setting a surprise
exam




2 version of the surprise exam announcement with suf-
ficiently large N the teacher has succeeded in setting a surprise exam by
using a random drawing to set the exam day and by revealing her method
in advance to the students. But in doing so she has, arguably, committed
a sin: her announcement– construed as an assertion– violates a constitutive
norm of assertability. Williamson (1996)26 provides powerful reasons for the
knowledge rule of assertability:
One must: assert that X only if one knows that X.
Combining the knowledge rule with the view, endorsed above, that mere high
probability resulting from a random draw does not sustain a knowledge claim
makes the teacher’s sin manifest. If the exam falls on day N then AN5 &S̃
N
1
is false; this is statistically unlikely, but on the endorsed view of knowledge
the teacher does not know when she makes her announcement that the exam
will not fall on day N no matter how large N and, thus, no matter how low
the probability of an exam on day N . Nor, according to Williamson, is the
teacher’s sin expiated by replacing the knowledge rule by the warrant rule of
assertability:
One must: assert that X only if one has warrant to assert X.
For onWilliamson’s view, “[p]robabilistic evidence warrants only an assertion
that something is probable”(Williamson 1996, p. 501).
The precocious students begin to wonder whether their teacher has inten-
tionally violated norms of assertability in order to inflict a surprise exam on
them. Their doubts fester, leading to suspicions about what other norms of
engagement the teacher may have violated and poisoning the atmosphere of
the class. Because of the bad teaching reviews she receives the teacher is not
promoted. She finds work as a Starbucks barista which, to her surprise, she
finds more rewarding than teaching philosophy. Sadly, she is laid off during
the Covid pandemic and is now on welfare. Such are the wages of tangling
with the surprise exam paradox.
26I am grateful to David Baker for calling this reference to my attention.
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9 Conclusion
Since the surprise exam announcement is open to so many different readings
it is hardly surprising that, despite all the effort philosophers have devoted to
it, there is no definitive resolution to be found for “the surprise exam para-
dox.”But has all the effort been rewarded by commensurate philosophical
insights that would mark the surprise exam as a worthy paradox? No, or at
least nothing in the present review has uncovered any insight that couldn’t
have been gleaned from other studies. The claim of the Introduction seems
vindicated: the problem with the surprise exam paradox lies not in resolving
the paradox(es) but in pinning down a worthy paradox.
Zombie like, the surprise exam lives on, refusing to die. There are two
reasons, one meretricious the other admirable. The former flows from the fact
that philosophers have many hammers in their tool kit and these hammers
need to find nails to pound, even if the pounding results largely in a lot of
noise. The more laudable reason is that the paradox reveals itself to be a
wonderful teaching instrument. A class demonstration of, say, the Sorensen
spatialized version of the paradox can be used to engage students’interest,
and once the students are hooked, their engagement with the paradox can
be used to motivate them explore issues in logic and epistemology.
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